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REMEDIES IN BANKRUPTCY OF PARTNERSHIP CREDITORS
ON TRANSFER OF FIRM ASSETS TO ONE PARTNER
THE retirement of any partner from the firm business works a dissolution
of the partnership.' The remaining partner or partners, so long as the firm
is solvent, then wind up the firm affairs and settle firm debts. 2 If the firm
is insolvent, and is undergoing liquidation by court proceeding, the equitable
rule of distribution,3 which is codified by the Uniform Partnership Act 4 and
the Bankruptcy Act,5 provides that firm creditors shall have a prior claim
to assets used in the partnership business, and that creditors of the individual
partners shall have priority in those partners' separate estates. Frequently,
however, the retiring partner or partners sell his or their interests in an
1. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 29; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP (1938) § 73.
2. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 37, 38; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP (1938) § 83.
3. Early cases applying this rule are collected in STORY, PARTNERSHIP (7th ed.
1881) §§263, n. 5, 363, 376, 377. See also STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (14th ed.
1918) §§918, 925; Amsinck v. Bean, 22 Wall. 395 (U. S. 1874).
4. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 40.
5. Section 5g, 52 STAT. 845, 11 U. S. C. § 23 (Supp. 1938). This provision is
virtually the same as that included in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 5f, 30 STAT. 547
(1898), 11 U. S. C. § 23 (1934).
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insolvent firm to a single partner, in exchange for the latter's assumption of
the firm debts. On the subsequent insolvency of the purchasing partner in
this situation, courts have held that the priority of firm creditors in firm
assets has been destroyed.0 They have ruled that a "bona fide" sale of the
interest of all but one partner effectively converts the firm assets into tile
separate property of the purchasing partner, so that firm creditor's are com-
pelled to share pro rata with individual creditors.
Thus the priority of firm creditors assured by the rule in equity was not
enforced against those claims of transferees or their creditors which had
not been pursued to judgment, for the courts evidently took the view that
the firm creditors' priority of access to firm assets was a rule of accounting
between the separate and firm estates on distribution during actual court
proceedings for liquidation. Unless the firm creditors had a judgment before
the transaction of transfer took place, their equity was too weak, it was held,
to survive, apparently on the ground that a greater deference to the claims
of firm creditors would stand in the way of a desirable freedom in com-
mercial affairs. The supposed equity of firmn creditors became effective only
upon the institution of court proceedings to wind up the firm's affairs, or,
illogically enough in terms of the rule, when the creditors obtained judgment.
Courts stated that the creditors' priorit, was dependent on the "equity" of
each partner that firm assets be first applied to the payment of firm debts;7
if in the exercise of their "bona fide" discretion, the partners converted the
firm property into the several property either of one of the partners or of a
third person before it was within the jurisdiction of the court, "the equities
6. Russell v. McCord, 21 Fed. Cas. 51, No. 12,157 (N. D. Mich. 1878); Reese &
Heylin v. Bradford, 13 Ala. 837 (1848); Schleicher Schumm & Co. v. Walker, 23 Fla.
6S0, 10 So. 33 (1891) semble; Hanford v. Prouty. 133 IIl. 339, 24 X. E. 565 (1890) ;
Armstrong v. Fahnestock, 19 Md. 58 (1862); Howe v. Lawrence, 9 Cush. 553 (Mass.
1852); Sanchez v. Goldfrank, 27 S. W. 204 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894); cf. Huist:amp v.
Moline Wagon Co., 121 U. S. 310 (1887); Fitzpatrick v. Flannagan, 106 U. S. 648
(1882); Coffin v. Day, 34 Fed. 687 (N. D. Ill. 1888); Lee v. Bradley Fertilizer Co., 44
Fla. 787, 33 So. 456 (1903); First National Bank v. Brubaker, 128 Iowa 537, 105 N. NV.
116 (1905); Jones v. Lusk, 2 Metc. 356 (Ky. 1859); Schmidlapp & Bros. v. Currie &
Co., 55 Miss. 597 (1878); Goddard-Peck Grocery Co. v. McCune, 122 Mo. 426, 25 S. W.
904 (1894) ; Sigler & Richey v. Knox County Bank, S Ohio St. 511 (1858); Wiggins v.
Blackshear, 86 Tex. 665, 26 S. W. 939 (1894). Other cases are collected in W,%r:z,
CorpRATE ADVAN- AGFS wrrHouT IN RPoroTION (1929) 71-78; PsEr, A,.D Lr.vxs,
CASES ON LAW OF AssociATIoIq (1915) 761; Brown, Taking Property of Insohent Part-
iership (1915) 81 CENT. L. J. 240; Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Criticism
(1915) 28 HARv. L. REv. 762, 774-5; Notes (1906) 2 L.ILA. (i,.s.) 256; (1895) 43
Am. St. Rep. 364, 372.
7. Case v. Beauregard, 99 U. S. 119 (1878) established this doctrine on a firm basis
in the United States. In England it had been settled by Lord Eldon in the leading case
of Ex parte Ruffin, 6 Ves. 119, 31 Eng. Rep. 970 (Cli. 1 01). The American cases are
collected in ROWLEY. MODmx LAW OF PARTNERSIP (1916) § 526. See Shroder, Distri-
bution of Assets of Bankrupt Partnerships and Partners (1905) 18 HMv. L. RLv. 495,
499; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP (1938) § 43.
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of the partners are extinguished, and consequently the derivative equities of
the creditors are at an end." s
The partners were thus permitted, provided they acted in good faith, to
prefer individual to firm creditors as they wished. Moreover, the evidential
standards adopted with regard to proof of bad faith in these transactions
were very strict. Even knowledge of firm insolvency at the time of the
transaction was sometimes held insufficient to negative good faith.0 These
strict requirements, however, were not universal. In England a transfer of
assets from an insolvent firm was considered a fraudulent conveyance. 10
In New Hampshire firm creditors were considered to have a "legal right"
to follow firm assets, a "right" which survived efforts of the partners to cut
it off."- In other states courts have held such a transfer fraudulent, either
because of insufficient consideration,' 2 or because of the disregard of equitable
priorities and the hindrance to firm creditorh if firm property be converted
to severalty during insolvency.' 3
8. Mr. Justice Strong, in Case v. Beauregard, 99 U. S. 119, 125 (1878). This doc-
trine was broadly affirmed in two subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court. Huiskamp
v. Moline Wagon Co., 121 U. S. 310 (1887); Fitzpatrick v. Flannagan, 106 U. S. 648
(1882). This analysis of the partnership relationship has been used to support, as against
firm creditors, the application, with consent of the partners, of the assets of ail insolvent
firm to payment of individual debts of a partner, Huiskamp v. Moline Wagon Co., supra;
or to payment of a debt of all the partners not a partnership debt, Vietor v. Glover, 17
Wash. 37, 48 Pac. 788 (1897) ; or to support a division of firm property among the part-
ners, Lee v. Bradley Fertilizer Co., 44 Fla. 787, 33 So. 456 (1902) ; or a claim of statu-
tory exemption in firm property on dissolution, Crawford v. Sternberg, 220 Fed, 73 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1915). Contra on last point: In re Turnock & Sons, 230 Fed. 985 (C. C. A. 7th,
1916) ; lIt re Jacobs, 21 F. (2d) 1006 (W. D. Mich. 1927), (1928) 41 HARV. L. REv.
664; cf. Dixon v. Koplar, 102 F. (2d) 295 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939).
9. Case v. Beauregard, 99 U. S. 119 (1878) ; In re Fackelman, 248 Fed. 565 (S. D.
Cal. 1918) ; Crawford v. Sternberg, 220 Fed. 73 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915) ; In re McConnell
& Williams, 32 Am. B. R. 589 (S. D. Cal. 1914) (referee) ; Lee v. Bradley Fertilizer
Co., 44 Fla. 787, 33 So. 456 (1903) ; cf. Hays v. Harris, 78 F. (2d) 66, 72 (C. C. A. 8th,
1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 613 (1935) ; Dakota Trust & Savings Bank v. Hanson, 5 F.
(2d) 915 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925) ; Sargent v. Blake, 160 Fed. 57 (C. C. A. 8th, 1908). Many
of the reports do not make clear whether or not knowledge of insolvency was present.
10. Ex parte Mayou, 4 DeG. J. & S. 664, 46 Eng. Rep. 1076 (Ch. App. 1865);
LINDLEY, PARTNERSHIP (10th ed. 1935) 414. Professor Warren suggests that the Ameri-
can courts erred in not following Ex parte M1fayou, as well as Ex parte Ruflit, 6 Ves. 119,
31 Eng. Rep. 970 (Ch. 1801). WARREN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORP'ORA-
TION (1929) 65-80.
11. Tenney v. Johnson, 43 N. H. 144 (1861); cf. Elliot v. Stevens, 38 N. H. 311
(1859) ; Ferson v. Monroe, 21 N. H. 462 (1850). See also Conroy & O'Connor v. Woods,
13 Cal. 626 (1859).
12. Caraway's Adm'rs v. Stealey, 44 W. Va. 163, 28 S. E. 793 (1897); Darby &
Co. v. Gilligan, 33 W. Va. 246, 10 S. E. 400 (1889); cf. Keith v. Fink, 47 Il1. 272 (1868).
13. Johnston v. Straus, 26 Fed. 57 (C. C. E. D. Va. 1882) ; Conroy & O'Connor v.
Woods, 13 Cal. 626 (1859) ; Roop v. Herron, 15 Neb. 73, 17 N. W. 353 (1883) ; Arnold
v. Hagerman, 45 N. J. Eq. 186, 17 At. 93 (1888); Bulger v. Rosa, 119 N. Y. 459, 24
N. E. 853 (1890) ; cf. Goodbar v. Cary, 16 Fed. 316 (N. D. Miss. 1882) ; Pritchett v.
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Bankruptcy courts under the 1898 Act1 4 occasionally followed the lead
of these cases,' 5 but the influence of the old line of decisions persisted and
the priority of firm creditors was often held lost through a prior "good
faith" transfer during insolvency.'0 The serious effect of such decisions on
the position of firm creditors cannot be doubted, even in the situation where
the purchasing partner has assumed the firm debts so as to put firm creditors
on a parity with, instead of behind, his individual creditors.' 7 Since the test
of firm solvency is the sufficiency of firm assets and the surplus of individual
assets of the partners over their individual liabilities,18 it is almost certain
Pollock & Co., 82 Ala. 169, 2 So. 735 (1887); Cron v. Cron's Estate, 56 IMich. 8, 22
N. W. 94 (1885); Clark-Jewell-Wells Co. v. Tolsma, 151 .Mich. 561, 115 X. W1 63
(1908); Jackson Bank v. Durfey, 72 Miss. 971, 18 So. 456 (1895). Other c,5urts tay
that the "derivative" right of firm creditors may not be impaired upon insolvency of the
firm. Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Henderson, 86 *Md. 452, 33 At. 991 (1897), (1893)
11 -L e v. L. Rsv. 552. See generally Cowles, The Firm as a Legal Person (1903) 57
CE m- L. J. 343.
14. 30 STAT. 544 (1898), 11 U. S. C. §§ 1-112 (1934).
15. Amundson v. Folsom, 219 Fed. 122 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914); In re Filmar, 177 Fed.
170 (C. C. A. 7th, 1910); In re Terens, 175 Fed. 495 (E. D. Wis. 1910); cf. It, ro
Turrentine & Thompson, 6 F. Supp. 490 (N. D. Tex. 1934) ; In re Brewer, 29 Fed. 79
(E. D. N. C. 1923); In re Turnock & Sons, 230 Fed. 985 (C. C. A. 7th, 1916); In re
Young, 223 Fed. 659 (D. Mass. 1915) ; In re Damare, 28 Am. B. R. 297 (S. D. Miss.
1912) (referee); In re Perlhefter, 177 Fed. 299 (S. D. N. Y. 1910) ; Holmes v. Baker
& Hamilton, 160 Fed. 922 (C. C. A. 9th, 1908); In re Head, 114 Fed. 4,9 (W. D. Ark.
1902) ; In re Denning, 114 Fed. 219 (D. Mass. 1902) ; In re Jones, 100 Fed. 781 (E. D.
Mo. 1900). See Comment (1910) 10 Co. L. REv. 467; Note (1928) 41 HAR%'. L REv.
664.
16. Titus v. 'Maxwell, 281 Fed. 433 (C. C. A. 6th, 1922) ; In re Fackelman, 243 Fed.
565 (S. D. Cal. 1918); In re Zartman, 242 Fed. 595 (1. D. Pa. 1917); Stringer v.
Stevenson, 240 Fed. 892 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917); In re Suprenant, 217 Fed. 470 (-X. D.
N. Y. 1914) semble; In re Kolber, 193 Fed. 281 (E. D. Pa. 1912) ; cf. Hays v. Harris,
78 F. (2d) 66, 72 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935) ; Dakota Trust & Savings Bank v. Hanson, 5 F.
(2d) 915 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925); In re Baker & Edwards, 224 Fed. ill (E. D. N. C.
1915); Ryan v. Cavanagh, 238 Fed. 604 (S. D. Iowa 1916); rapple v. Dutton, 226 Fed.
430 (C. C. A. 9th, 1915), (1916) 16 COL. L. REv. 355; Crawford v. Sternberg, 220 Fed.
73 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915); Warner v. Grafton Woodworking Co., 210 Fed. 12 (C. C. A.
4th, 1913); Sargent v. Blake, 160 Fed. 57 (C. C. A. 8th, 1908); In re 1McConnell &
Williams, 32 Am. B. R. 589 (S. D. Cal. 1914) (referee). See 6 PR " B,.:n:z -
RupTcy (4th ed. 1937) §2935. In Dean v. Davis, 242 U. S. 438 (1917), Mr. Justice
Brandeis in a footnote cited Sargent v. Blake, one of the cases most frequently cited in
support of this doctrine, as a case difficult to reconcile "with the great .,eight of author-
ity and the decisions of this court." Id. at 446.
17. In the rare event that firm assets are negligible, and assets of the purchasing
partner considerable, it is clear that firm creditors will have no reason to object to loss
of priority in firm assets.
18. Francis v. McNeal, 228 U. S. 695 (1913) ; Mfeek v. Beezer, 28 F. (24) 343 (C.
C. A. 3d, 1928), cert. denied. 278 U. S. 651 (1929) ; Vaccaro v. Security Bank of M.1fem-
phis, 103 Fed. 436 (C. C. A. 6th, 1900). A similar definition of insolvency is contained
in Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 2(2); cf. Um xropm PAUTtr-.Os5HP AcT § 40(a).
But the Supreme Court has hinted that the method of determining firm insolvency is still
open to argument. Liberty Nat. Bank v. Bear, 276 U. S. 215, 224, n. 9 (1928).
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that if the firm were insolvent at the time of transfer, the purchasing partner's
estate, augmented by the former firm property, will be far from adequate
to pay all creditors. Therefore, to treat as an evanescent "derivative equity"
the priority on which firm creditors have relied in dealing with the firm seems
to those unacquainted with the mysteries of jurisprudence highly unfair.10
Under the Chandler Act, 20 firm creditors seem to have at last a hopeful
prospect of escape from this inequity. Several preliminary steps are neces-
sary, however, before the creditors can take advantage of the remedies pro-
vided by the Act. First, they must promptly assert their opposition to the
transfer. If they assent, as they may sometimes wish to do, to the assump-
tion of the firm debts by the purchasing partner, the novation effectively
discharges the firm obligation as such.21 If, moreover, the firm creditors
are not willing to share pro rata with the individual creditors, they must
take care not to be barred from relief by laches or by a finding of tacit
acquiescence in the assumption of firm debts by the remaining partner.2"
Provided, however, that they act in time, firm creditors may file against
the dissolved firm a petition under the Bankruptcy Act, if they can show
the occurrence of a firm act of bankruptcy within four months prior to
the petition. 23 The existence of such an act of bankruptcy will depend in
19. Cf. Dodd, Dogma and Practice in the Law of Associations (1929) 42 HARy. L.
REv. 977, 998; Dodd, American Business Association Law a Hundred Years Ago and
Today in 3 LAw-A CENTURY OF PROGRESS (1937) 254, 260.
20. 52 STAT. 840, 11 U. S. C. § I et seq. (Supp. 1938).
21. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 36; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 428. Dis-
solution of itself does not discharge the existing liability of any partner. UNIFORM PART-
NERSHIP Act §36(1); CRANE, PARTNERSHIP (1938) §79. Section 41(2) of the Act
provides that if the remaining partner continues the business, creditors of the dissolved
firm are also his creditors, whether or not he assumed the firm debts.
22. Cf. UNIFORI PARTNERSHIP ACT §36(2); CRANE, PARTNERSHIP (1938) §79.
If a partner on retiring from a firm fails to give adequate notice of his retirement, he is
considered a partner by estoppel as to subsequent creditors ignorant of the change in firm
membership, and he may in certain instances bind the partnership by his acts. UNIFORM
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 35; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP (1938) § 81. However, a partnership by
estoppel cannot be adjudged a bankrupt, nor can an estoppel partner, despite his personal
liability to estoppel creditors, be adjudged a member of a bankrupt partnership. In re
Ganaposki, 27 F. Supp. 41 (M. D. Pa. 1939) ; In re Kuntz, 33 F. (2d) 198 (M. D. Pa.
1929); In re Pinson & Co., 180 Fed. 787 (N. D. Ala. 1910); 1 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY
(4th ed. 1934) § 71; cf. Marquette Cloak & Suit Co. v. Netter & Meyer, 151 So. 820 (La.
App. 1934) ; In re Fahey, 26 F. (2d) 382 (S. D. Tex. 1928) ; In re Kaplan, 234 Fed. 866
(C. C. A. 7th, 1916) ; In re Evans, 161 Fed. 590 (N. D. Ga. 1908) ; Thayer.v. Humphrey,
91 Wis. 276, 64 N. W. 1007 (1895), (1896) 9 HARv. L. REv. 433. Comparable estoppel
problems arise when a stranger to the firm represents himself as a partner. See UNIFORM,
PARTNERSHIP AcT § 16.
23. "A partnership . . . during the continuation of the partnership business or after
its dissolution and before the final settlement thereof may be adjudged a bankrupt . . ."
§ 5a, 52 STAT. 845, 11 U. S. C. § 23 (Supp. 1938). It is settled that a partnership may
be adjudicated a bankrupt as a separate entity, without regard to any adjudication of
bankruptcy against the partners as individuals. Liberty Nat. Bank v. Bear, 276 U. S.
[Vol. 49: 686
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most cases 24 on a determination of whether the sale of one partner's interest
in the firm to his copartner constitutes a fraudulent or preferential transfer
of firm assets within the meaning of Sections 3a(1) or 3a(2) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.
The first question to be answered in the solution of this problem is whether
the transaction amounts to a "transfer" in the-sense in which that word is
used in the Bankruptcy Act.25 As a practical matter, the sale of one partner's
interest in a firm of two partners should be regarded as a conveyance of
partnership property to the partner purchasing the interest, at least for the
purposes of Section 3a(1) and 3a(2). It may well be questioned whether
such a conveyance can be valid;26 but if held valid, it terminates the part-
215 (1928). See Comments (1929) 29 CoL. L. Ray. 1134; (1928) 41 HAxLv. L. RI.
1044. §§ 5a and 5b of the present Act make statutory provision for such an adjudication.
A firm may be adjudicated when the only evidence of its continued existence is its unpaid
debts and the surviving assets in one partner's hands. Amundson v. Folsom, 219 Fed.
122 (C. C.A. 8th, 1914) ; It re Perlhefter, 177 Fed. 299 (S. D. N.Y. 1910) ; Holmes v.
Baker & Hamilton, 160 Fed. 922 (C. C. A. 9th, 1903) ; cf. In re Hirsch, 97 Fed. 571 (S.
D. N. Y. 1899); In re Levy, 95 Fed. 812 (N. D. N. Y. 1S99). But cf. In re Pinson &
Co., 180 Fed. 787 (N. D. Ala. 1910); In re Young, 223 Fed. 659 (D. 'ass. 1915). A
firm may be adjudicated bankrupt after its dissolution by the death of one of the two
partners. ln re Salladay, 22 F. (2d) 300 (E. D. Ill. 1927) ; In re Lomont, 9 F. (2d) 407
(D. Md. 1925); In re Wells, 298 Fed. 109 (S. D. Ohio 1924).
24. Some other act of bankruptcy, such as the appointment of an equity receiver in
a state court, may be available. Again the necessity of finding any act of bankruptcy
may be unnecessary under § 5i which provides that a partnership vill be adjudged bank-
rupt, if all the general partners are in bankruptcy; thus if the selling, as well as the pur-
chasing partner be adjudged bankrupt, automatic adjudication of the firm Uill follow.
Another possibility for securing firm adjudication lies in the new § 5b. The transferor
partner, seeing the purchasing partner on the threshold of bankruptcy, might, under § 5b,
file a petition "in behalf of" the partnership, alleging firm insolvency. The vendor partner,
whose liability to partnership creditors still subsists [CI.La, PAtRMRnsHIP (1933) §79],
might thus forestall the possibility of having to pay the full amount of firm creditors'
claims, with no prospect of full remuneration from the purchasing partner. See note 26
infra.
25. An act of bankruptcy by a person shall consist, under § 3a(1), of his having
"conveyed, transferred, concealed, removed, or permitted to be concealed or removed any
part of his property . . .;" under § 3a(2), of his having "transferrcd while insolvent
any part of his property . ." (Italics supplied).
26. In states which have adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, it is,
if the firm is or will be rendered insolvent, specifically outlawed under § 8 of the Act.
This section was intended to protect creditors against transfer of any asset available to
the creditor. GLETNN, FRAtmuLENT CONvEYANCES (1931) §§ 138, 139. Hence the transfer
of a partner's interest with its accompanying conversion of firm property into individual
property would presumably be so substantial an interference with firm assets as to come
within the scope of the section. The transaction, however, creates a valid contract between
the partners. Even though the promisor is insolvent, his promise to assume firm debts
is good consideration. REsTA TN, CoNTRAmCs (1932) § 455. If the vendor partner
is later compelled to pay firm debts by reason of his continuing personal liability, he has
a right of recovery in full under the contract of transfer, instead of the contribution due
under the partnership agreement. On occasion such a transfer is made solely for a
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nership tenancy, and substitutes full ownership by the individual partner.
Whatever doubt may previously have existed on the point should be regarded
as removed by the enlarged definition of "transfer" in Section 1(30) of the
Chandler Act. The word "transfer" under that section "shall include the
sale and every other and different mode, direct or indirect, of disposing of or
of parting with property or ,with an interest therein or with the possession
thereof . . ."27 What is transferred to the purchasing partner is the vendor
partner's interest, which under the Uniform Partnership Act, is his share
of the profits and surplus after payment of firm debts ;28 but the effect of
the transaction on firm creditors is to end the partnership tenancy as com-
pletely as if the firm property were conveyed to a third person. This change
in the manner of holding firm property should be considered a sufficient
indirect method of "parting" with that property to bring it within the scope
of Section 1(30), at least for purposes of Sections 3a(1) and 3a(2).
It seems unlikely, however, that the succession of a partner to the firm
assets, as purchaser of his partner's interest, even though it has the effect
of preferring individual over firm creditors, would be held a preference
within the meaning of Section 3a(2) ; for that result it is regarded as neces-
sary that the conveyance under attack as a preference prefer one of the
transferor's creditors over his other creditors, 2 whereas in this case the
"transferee" is not a creditor, and the creditors preferred are those of the
transferee. Of course, the strength of this objection depends upon how
essential it is, for the purposes of Section 3a(2), that the transferee be a
creditor, and upon the extent to which the court regards the firm as an
entity separate from its members, despite their liability for "firm" debts.
Difficulties of doctrine on both counts make it unlikely that the purchase
of or succession to partners' interests by a single partner will be considered
an act of bankruptcy as a preference.
monetary consideration with no assumption of debts. Hanford v. Prouty, 133 Ill. 339,
24 N. E. 565 (1890). But only slight evidence is necessary to warrant the inference that
the purchasing partner also assumed the firm debts. Cf. Kavanagh v. Johnson, 290 Mass.
587, 195 N. E. 797 (1935).
27. The 1938 amendments are indicated by the italicized words.
28. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 26. The Act has, in the words of one commentator,
placed title to firm property in each partner as "co-owner whose interest is sid generis"
[Comment (1925) 39 HARv. L. Ray. 247], thereby establishing what § 25 of the Act
describes as a tenancy in partnership. On the Uniform Partnership Act, see generally
Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act (1915) 24 YALE L. J. 617; Crane, The Uniform
Partnership Act-A Criticism (1915) 28 HARv. L. Rav. 762; Lewis, The Uniform Part-
nership Act (1915) 29 HARv. L. Rav. 158; Comment (1925) 39 HARv. L. Rav. 247;
WARREN, CoRP'oRATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPORATION (1929) 293-301.
29. Under §3a(2) a firm commits an act of bankruptcy if it has "transferred, while
insolvent, any portion of his [the firm's] property to one or more of his [the firm's]
creditors with intent to prefer such creditors over his [the firm's] other creditors." Cf.
Donadio v. Robetsky, 4 F. (2d) 51, 52 (C. C. A. 1st, 1925) ; 1 REmINGTON, BANKRUPTCY
(4th ed. 1934) §§ 128.50, 181.
[Vol. ,49: 686
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Firm creditors will also find difficulties in the language of Section 3a(1),
which requires a conveyance with "intent to hinder, delay, or defraud"
creditors,30 and is traditionally interpreted in the light of the Statute of
Elizabeth.31 Several factors, however, combine to offer the firm creditors
a chance of success under this subdivision. The courts have interpreted
Section 3a(1) much more broadly than Section 14c(4), which is almost
identically worded, but deals with the denial of a discharge.32 Since discharge
depends mainly on the motives, and adjudication primarily on the economic
situation of the bankrupt, the courts have drawn two distinctions between
the two sections. A transaction must hinder, delay and defraud to justify
the denial of a discharge;33 it may be an act of bankruptcy if it hinders,
delays, or defrauds creditors. 34 Further, Section 14c(4) requires strong
evidence of actual intent to defraud, while under Section 3a(1) the standards
are much less strict, and the circumstances surrounding the transaction, such
as the absence of consideration to the transferor, are more freel- accepted
as evidence of the requisite intent.35 The liberality of the evidential standards
of "intent" under Section 3a(1) will be still further increased if the section
is interpreted in the light of the new Section 67d(4) introduced by the
Chandler Act.
30. Transfer of insolvent firm's assets to single partner was found an act of bank-
ruptcy in In re Turrentine & Thompson, 6 F. Supp. 490 (N. D. Tem. 1934) ; and Amund-
son v. Folsom, 219 Fed. 122 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914). See In re Fackelman, 243 Fed. 55,
567 (S. D. Cal. 1918) ; In re Head, 114 Fed. 489, 490 (IV. D. Ark. 1902) ; In re Gillette,
104 Fed. 769 (XV. D. N. Y. 1900); Lastrapes v. Blanc, 14 Fed. Cas. 1164, No. 8,100
(C. C. D. La. 1878); In re latot, 16 Fed. Cas. 1109, No. 9,282 (D. Vt. 1S77). But see
Donadio v. Robetsky, 4 F. (2d) 51, 52 (C. C. A. 1st, 1925) (dissolution found to be
bogus, giving partner right to property transferred to him) ; In re Perlhefter, 177 Fed.
299, 304 (S. D. N. Y. 1910) (suggesting that since firm creditors can follow firm assets,
no fraud is involved).
31. 13 ELiz., c. 5 (1571). See Johnson, Baillie Shoe Co. v. Bardsley, Elmer &
Nichols, 237 Fed. 763 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916) ; In re McLoon, 162 Fed. 575 (D. Me. 1903);
Lansing Boiler Works v. Ryerson, 128 Fed. 701 (C. C. A. 6th, 1904) ; Githens v. Shiftier,
112 Fed. 505 (M. D. Pa. 1902); Gu.raBr's COLLIER ON BAxKRuPrCY (4th ed. 1937)
§§ 117, 123.
32. Under § 14c( 4) the court shall grant a discharge unless, within twelve months
before filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the bankrupt has transferred, or permitted to
be transferred, any of his property "with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors'
33. The policy of refusing discharge only in case of personal fault requires this strict
interpretation. In re Sandier, 26 F. Supp. 841 (D. Md. 1939); In re Rice & Reuben,
43 F. (2d) 378 (D. Mle. 1930); Feder v. Goetz, 264 Fed. 619 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920);
GiLBEr's CoLre oir BA PTm'rcY (4th ed. 1937) §§ 495, 496.
34. In re Lampros, Inc., 18 F. (2d) 633 (D. Mass. 1927) ; In re Condon, 198 Fed.
947 (S.D. N.Y. 1912); In re Hughes, 183 Fed. 872 (S.D. N.Y. 1910) ; Guxurnr's CoL-
Lim oN BANKUrPCYr (4th ed. 1937) § 125.
35. Cf. In re Goumas, 51 F. (2d) 126 (NV. D. N. Y. 1931); Mente & Co., Inc. v.
Old River Co., 17 F. (2d) 350 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927); Bean Chamberlain Mfg. Co. v.
Standard Spoke & Nipple Co., 131 Fed. 215 (C. C. A. 6th, 1904) ; Gnnxrar's CoT T= on
BANKRUPTCY (4th. ed. 1937) §§ 121, 123, 125.
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Section 67d(4) deals with the power of the trustee of an adjudicated firm
to set aside fraudulent conveyances of firm property. Under this section,
which embodies with a few minor changes Section 8 of the Uniform Fraudu-
lent Conveyance Act,36 intent is specifically ruled out as a factor in determining
whether a transfer is fraudulent. Every transfer of partnership property,
when the partnership is, or will be thereby rendered insolvent, is "fraudulent
as to partnership creditors . . . without regard to actual intent" if the con-
veyance is made "(a) to a partner, whether with or without a promise by
him to pay partnership debts, or (b) to a person not a partner without fair
consideration to the partnership as distinguished from consideration to the
individual partners."3 7  Thus a transfer by one partner of his interest in
an insolvent firm in exchange for the purchasing partner's assumption of
firm debts, assuming that it constitutes a "transfer" of firm property, can
be set aside by the firm trustee, under subdivision (a). The drafters of the
section felt that "it is improper for partners to assign the partnership property
to one of their number when they are insolvent." 38 They recognized that
such a transfer may involve as real a diminution of the assets available for
firm creditors as does a conveyance of firm assets to a third party without
consideration to the firm. That this is so is made clear by the fact that
in Section 67d(1) the traditional test of partnership solvency is codified,30
as it is in the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act 40 and the Uniform
Partnership Act.41 Since under this test it is ordinarily "impossible that a
36. Except for the provision "without regard to actual intent" and the time limitation
of one year prior to bankruptcy, this section is substantially identical with § 8 of the
Uniform Act. See McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill (1937) 4 U. oF Cu1. L.
REv. 369, 384-388.
37. A solvent firm may or may not be rendered insolvent by transfer of firm assets
to a partner. The surplus of the partners' assets are included in any determination of
partnership solvency, but a relatively large deficit on an individual partner's separate
account may absorb any surplus on firm account, thus making payment in full of firm
assets impossible if the transfer is upheld.
38. Notes to § 22, Draft D, of the Uniform Partnership Act, which embodied pro-
visions similar to those of § 67d (4). The entire section on fraudulent conveyances was
later omitted from the Partnership Act in order that the field of fraudulent conveyances
might be completely covered by the Uniform Act on that subject. The corresponding
section of the seventh draft of the Partnership Act is quoted in Crane, The Uniform Part-
nership Act-A Criticism (1915) 28 HA4 .v. L. REv. 762, 776. The notes to § 7 (present
§ 8] of the second draft of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act observe that "the
existing case law on the subject of this section is in such confusion that it is impossible
to state whether the section as drafted represents the weight of authority." (1917) 27
PROC. OF NAT. CONF. OF Com M's ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 250, 256. The fact this
section is specifically designed to cover a conveyance of this sort lends further strength
to the argument that transfer of a partner's interest is a "transfer" of partnership property
within the statutory definition. See also pp. 691-692 sipra.
39. See p. 689 supra.
40. UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CoNvEYANCE AcT § 2(2).
41. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIp ACT § 40(a).
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firm should be insolvent while the members of it remained able to pay its
debts with money available for that end," 42 loss of priority in one of the
available funds may lead to a material loss to firm creditors. Even in the
rare event that no loss results, firm creditors should have the right to set
the transaction aside
43
It seems unlikely, on the other hand, that the trustee of an adjudicated
firm could attack the transfer of firm property to a single partner as a voidable
preference under Section 60b.4 4 Again there is the same difficulty which
arose under Section 3a(2) ;45 the statute says that the preferential transfer
must enable the transferee creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his
debt than some other creditor of the same class. However, the transfer in
question is not to a creditor, nor does it benefit creditors of the transferor,
which is the firm; nor is the preference created one between creditors of
the same class. An alternative attack with a greater likelihood of success is
found in Section 5h, under which the court is to marshal the assets of the
partnership and individual estates "so as to prevent preferences and secure
the equitable distribution of the property of the several estates." 40 Prefer-
ences within the meaning of this section have, in judicial usage, not been
limited to the definition of Section 60 ;47 rather it appears that the term means
preferences as between different classes of creditors - those of the firm and
those of the individual partners. This conclusion is supported both by the
statutory language and by the interpretation given it by the courts. Section
5h is intended to "secure the equitable distribution of the property of the
several estates." The courts have ruled that 5h does not limit, but rather
strengthens and executes the distribution provisions of 5g, under which
42. Mr. justice Holmes in Francis v. McNeal, 228 U. S. 695, 700 (1913).
43. See notes to § 22, Draft D, Uniform Partnership Act. But cf. Irving Trust Co.
v. Chase Nat. Bank, 65 F. (2d) 409 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933), (1935) 29 IL. L. R v. 799.
It is always possible that a bona fide purchaser, a "non-conductor" in .Mr. Justice Holmes'
phrase [Donnell v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co., 203 U. S. 267, 273 (1903)] will inter-
pose himself between the trustee and firm property and prevent recovery thereof. See
GLENN, FRAUDULEXT CONVEYANCES (1931) §§ 236, 237.
44. This section requires that if a preference is to be voidable, the creditor receiving
it must, at the time when the transfer is made, have reasonable cause to believe that the
debtor is insolvent. Campanella v. Liebowitz, 103 F. (2d) 252 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
45. See p. 692 supra. On partnership preferences, see Wartell v. Moore, 261 Fed.
762 (C. C. A. 6th, 1919); Mills v. Fisher, 159 Fed. 897 (C. C. A. 6th, 1903); Rubenstein
v. Lottow, 220 Mass. 156, 107 N. E. 718 (1915), 223 Mass. 227, 111 N. E. 973 (1916) ;
4 Rxsxi-roi, BANN.RUPYCY (4th ed. 1935) §§ 1652, 1681, 1635, 1810; 6 id. at §§ 2931-
2933.
46. This subsection is identical with § 5g of the 1893 Act.
47. Fort Pitt Coal & Coke Co. v. Diser, 239 Fed. 443 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917); In re
Filmar, 177 Fed. 170 (C. C. A. 7th, 1910); In re Terens, 175 Fed. 495 (r. D. Wis.
1910) ; In re Denning, 114 Fed. 219 (D. Mass. 1902) ; In re Jones, 100 Fed. 781 (E. D.
Mo. 1900) ; cf. In re Damare, 28 Am. B. R. 297 (S. D. Miss. 1912) (referee).
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the firm creditors are given their priority.48 Since, therefore, courts of bank-
ruptcy, both by statute49 and by case law, 0 have equity powers, it seems
reasonable to assume that the court has authority to set aside transfers which
annul the rule of Section 5g, at least when the transfer is made in contem-
plation of bankruptcy. 1 If this be granted, Section 5h may be invoked
either by the trustee of an adjudicated firm,5 2 or by firm creditors on bank-
ruptcy of the partner to whom firm assets had been assigned. In either case
the court would marshal the assets to preserve the respective priorities of
firm and individual creditors. Thus if the purchasing partner, but not the
firm, is in bankruptcy, firm creditors may be able to preserve their priority
without the necessity for finding a basis for firm adjudication.
In states which have adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act a
or passed statutes containing provisions similar to the partnership section
48. Fort Pitt Coal & Coke Co. v. Diser, 239 Fed. 443 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917) ; In rc
Filmar, 177 Fed. 170 (C. C. A. 7th, 1910); In re Terens, 175 Fed. 495 (E. D. Wis.
1910) ; In re Denning, 114 Fed. 219 (D. Mass. 1902). Present § 5g is substantially the
same as old § 5f; present § 5h is identical with old § 5g. Judge Lowell, in In re Denning,
supra at 221, said: "Moreover, section 5g [present § 5h] of the bankruptcy act was in-
tended, I believe, . . . to permit the court to deal with conversions of this kind so as
not only to prevent preference in the technical meaning of that word, but also so as to
'secure the equitable distribution of property of the several estates.'"
49. Section 2a of the Bankruptcy Act invests courts of bankruptcy "with such juris-
diction at law and in equity as will enable them to exercise original jurisdiction in
proceedings under this Act."
50. Courts of Bankruptcy "are essentially courts of equity, and their proceedings
inherently proceedings in equity." Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago,
R. I. & P. Ry., 294 U. S. 648, 675 (1935). Cf. Donald v. San Antonio Joint Stock Land
Bank, 100 F. (2d) 312 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938); GILBERr'S COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY (4th
ed. 1937) § 23.
51. Professor Warren has suggested that transfers made by insolvent partners might
be upset "on the ground that, if allowed to stand, they would prevent the proper distri-
bution of the assets under the bankruptcy statute." WaRaEN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES
WITHOUT INCORPORATION (1929) 69. This theory finds support in common law cases
which set aside such transfers on equitable principles; cf. cases cited in notes 11, 13 snpra.
In Howe v. Lawrence, 9 Cush. 553, 558 (Mass. 1852), the court said that the transfer
of joint property to a co-partner, with knowledge of insolvency of the firm, and with
intent to deprive the creditors of the "proper application to the payment of the joint
debts" of the firm assets, is a fraud at law, and equity would at once set it aside.
52. The trustee of an adjudicated firm may order a partner not individually adjudi-
cated to turn over his estate for administration in firm bankruptcy proceedings. Francis
v. McNeal, 228 U. S. 695 (1913). The firm trustee may thus reach assets of either
vendor or purchasing partners.
53. The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act has been adopted by 16 states. 9
U. L. A. (Supp. 1938) 94. The Uniform Partrership Act has been adopted by 18 states.
7 U. L. A. (Supp. 1938) 5. Thirteen states have adopted both acts, among them New
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Michigan. On the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act, see generally GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANcEs (1931) ;
McLaughlin, Application of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (1933) 46 I-Iav.
L. REV. 404; Legis. (1925) 25 COL. L. REV. 487, 489-490. On the application of § 8, see
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of that Act, upon which Section 67d(4) is based, additional remedies are
open to the trustee of an adjudicated firm. Under Section 70e. which pro-
vides that a conveyance fraudulent as to creditors under state law is void
as against the trustee of the transferor, it may be possible to avoid the one
year limitation on such action contained in Section 67d(4). s On the other
hand, instead of seeking an adjudication under the Bankruptcy .Vt, firm
creditors may prefer to bring appropriate action under state frauduknt
conveyance laws, if such laws contain provisions applicable to partnership
transfers of this sort. Again, they may rely for relief on the rule thlat a
constructive trust max be imposed on one who assists or encouragcs a
fraudulent conveyance by the debtor to a third person, if the abettor thereof
has received benefits, either directly or indirectly, from the conveyance.rO
If the individual creditors of the purchasing partntr had I:nwn oi firm
insolvency, and had assisted or encouraged the transfer of firm a-eets to a
single partner, they would be subject to this rule, having benefited at least
indirectly by the conveyance ;G7 an action for an accounting brought Jy the
firm creditors against such of the individual creditors as were privy to the
transaction would properly lie.
The most hopeful remedy for firm creditors on transfer of the property
of an insolvent firm to a single partner, however, lies in the power of the
trustee to set the transfer aside as fraudulent under Section 67d(4). This
section seems specifically directed at this type of transfer; in permitting the
trustee to set aside such transfers without reference to the partners' intent,
inferred or otherwise, it places the emphasis in defining fraudulent con-
veyances where it should be placed - on the economic situation of the firm
at the time of the transfer. If a proper basis for firm adjudication can he
found, Section 67d(4) seems to furnish a conclusive answer to the caes
which give the partners a right to destroy the priority of firm creditors s'o
long as they do it in "good faith." In Section 3a(1), such a basis for firm
Liebowitz v. Arrow Roofing Co., 259 N. Y. 391, 182 N. E. 58 (1932); Cnn, Pwr:.r-
sHnip (1938) §46; G.EN-x, FrAuDUL=NT COnvEYANCES (1931) §§215-219.
54. State statutes of limitation frequently allow a longer period in which actions may
be brought. GILBERT's Coy TR ox B.A-Ir'PrCY (4th ed. 1937) § 1557. But the definition
of what constitutes insolvency in a bankruptcy sense does not ccntrzd in determinig
whether a debtor was insolvent so as to make a voluntary conveyance fraudulert under
state law. Underleak v. Scott, 117 AMinn. 136, 134 N. M. 731 (1912).
55. For various forms of state relief, see Grx:n.. FRnAuTu.rr Co,,vnA,:cc (1931)
§§ 63-93. Many state acts require "intent to disturb, delay, hinder or defraud." Sce ILL.
ANNx. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1936) c. 59, § 4; OR-. Coan Aim. (1930) § 63-507, 63-510;
VA. CODE ANN. (Mlichie & Sublett, 1936) § 51S4.
56. Duell v. Brewer, 92 F. (2d) 59 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), (1938) 47 Y.,n L. J. 840,
(1938) 24 VA. L. REv. 325.
57. There is a possibility that tort liability might be impoved on the atatr of a
fraudulent conveyance, if he has benefitted thereby. Cf. Duell v. Brewer, 92 F. (24) 59,
61 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) ; Note (1938) 112 A. L. R. 1250. But cf. (1938) 24 VA. L RE,. 325.
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adjudication appears to be provided. The liberal interpretation of the intent
requirement makes it quite probable that the courts will adopt the policy
of Section 67d (4) and consider insolvency of the firm at the time of transfer
an important evidential consideration in inferring the requisite intent to hinder,
delay or defraud firm creditors.58 Nevertheless, the retention of the formal
requirement of intent, together with the specific limitation of the standards
of Section 67d(4) to that section,5 9 leaves the possibility that firm creditors,
when unable to prove "intent," or to discover any other act of bankruptcy, o0
may be abandoned to the often inadequate remedies of the state law.0 1 Such
a result would be unfortunate; subjective standards of intent have an
appropriate place in determining whether a bankrupt shall be granted a
discharge, but none in deciding whether he shall be adjudicated. It is to
be hoped that, in the absence of a major legislative revision of the machinery
of acts of bankruptcy, courts will follow the lead of Section 67d(4), and
interpret the wording of Section 3a(1) so as to give firm creditors a remedy
in bankruptcy against this kind of change in the internal organization of the
firm whenever the firm is insolvent at the time of the transaction.
02
58. While insolvency at the time the transfer became effective is not required under
§3a(1), solvency at the time the petition is filed is, under § 3c, a complete defense to
any proceedings under the first act of bankruptcy. Under the old Act, Judge Learned
Hand said that it would "violate the whole theory of bankruptcy" if §3a(1) and the
old § 67e were interpreted as setting up different standards. In re Condon, 198 Fed. 947,
951 (S. D. N. Y. 1912) ; see generally Hadley, Fraudulent Convcyance as an Act of
Bankruptcy (1934) 9 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 261.
59. The definitions and standards used in § 67d are specifically "for the purposes
of, and exclusively applicable to, this subdivision d."
60. The conveyance of firm assets will, in most cases, be the only firm act upon
which an act of bankruptcy may be based.
61. The statutes of many states require "intent" if a fraudulent conveyance is to be
set aside. See note 55 supra.
62. Professor Treiman has persuasively suggested that acts of bankruptcy be replaced
by the sole requirement of insolvency, with appropriate indicia thereof, at the time of the
petition. Treiman, Acts of Bankruptcy, A Medieval Concept in Modern Bankruptcy Law
(1938) 52 HARV. L. REv. 189.
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